

13 AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND WARNING GROUP (PROVISIONAL)

MISSION

LINEAGE

13 Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Provisional), 20 Jul 1945

STATIONS

Leyte Island, Philippine Islands

ASSIGNMENTS

XIII Fighter Command

COMMANDERS

Lt Col Henry C. Byrd

HONORS

Service Streamers

Campaign Streamers

Armed Forces Expeditionary Streamers

Decorations

EMBLEM

MOTTO

OPERATIONS

13th Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Provisional) was formed at Leyte Island, Philippine Islands, on 20 July, 1945 with a provisional manning strength of one hundred eighty nine (189) Officers, five (5) warrant officers and one thousand eight hundred sixty (1,860) enlisted men. This provisional Group is assigned to the XIII Fighter Command and is placed under the operational control of Headquarters Thirteenth Air Force.

Experience in the European Theater of Operations has clearly indicated the desirability of integrating into a single organization all aircraft warning, fighter control and tactical control elements required for the support of a field army. The Aircraft Control and Warning Group was evolved to fill this need. The function of an aircraft control and warning group is to provide all aircraft warning, fighter control, and close support control facilities required for the close support and air defense of one field army deployed along a front not to exceed 100 miles in width or depth.

TOKYO, Oct. 12—Japan's radar defense was so ineffective that it could not tell whether approaching planes were its own or American, Fifth Air Force experts reported today after inspecting the Tokyo fighter control center. Neither could the radar indicate the-height or number of planes. American personnel watched Japanese military personnel headed by Col. H. Saso, staff officer in charge of the center, give a demonstration of battle conditions. The information was funneled to the center from 1,600 observation posts and radar stations in the Tokyo area. Fifth Air Force experts said that was several times too many. "After Iwo Jima fell, plane "warnings first came from naval radar stations on Chichi Jima and, Haha Jima," Saso said "That usually was about four hours before your planes reached the (Honshu) coast. The reports were very meager, reporting merely that enemy planes were headed in the general direction of the Japanese homeland. Japanese radar could not tell the number, height or direction with any degree of accuracy. Once the planes crossed the Japanese coast, they broke a photo-electric line that stretched along a good portion of the Japanese homeland. Once planes had been spotted by ground observers in the Tokyo area, they dropped completely from the radar board. "What kind of a rescue system did you have for pilots shot down at sea?" asked Lt. Col. Henry C. Byrd, Jr., radar expert. "At first we asked the navy to pick up our pilots," Saso said. Then spreading his hands in a helpless gesture, he added "later on, there was no navy."

1945 Subordinate Units

131st AC&WS, Light Mobile (Provisional)

132nd AC&WS, Heavy (P)

133rd AC&WS, Mobile (P)

134th AC&WS, Light Mobile (P)

135th Tactical Control Squadron (P)

319th Fighter Control Squadron

557th Signal Air Warning Battalion

597th Signal Air Warning Battalion

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORIES

Created: 23 May 2013

Updated:

Sources

Air Force Historical Research Agency. U.S. Air Force. Maxwell AFB, AL.